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The Nuclear Engineer, c. 1940-68
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Canada, as one of the three Allied nations collaborating on atomic energy development during the
Second World War, had an early start in applying its new knowledge and defining a new profession.
Owing to postwar secrecy and distinct national aims for the field, nuclear engineering was shaped
uniquely by the Canadian context. Alone among the postwar powers, Canadian exploration of atom-
ic energy eschewed military applications; the occupation emerged within a governmental monopoly;
the intellectual content of the discipline was influenced by its early practitioners, administrators,
scarce resources, and university niches; and a self-recognized profession coalesced later than did its
American and British counterparts. This paper argues that the history of the emergence of Canadian
nuclear engineers exemplifies unusually strong shaping of technical expertise by political and cul-
tural context.
Le Canada, une des trois nations Alliées collaborant au développement de l’énergie atomique durant
la Deuxième Guerre mondiale connut une avance précoce dans la mise en application de cette nou-
velle connaissance et dans la définition de cette nouvelle profession. À cause du secret de l’après-
guerre et des buts nationaux très nets, l’industrie nucléaire fut modelée uniquement par le contexte
canadien. Le Canada, dans son exploration de l’énergie nucléaire et dans son abstention d’en consi-
dérer les usages militaires, faisait cavalier seul parmi les puissances d’après-guerre; la profession
s’instaura à l’intérieur d’un monopole gouvernemental; le contenu intellectuel de la discipline fut
influencé par ses premiers praticiens et administrateurs, par la pauvreté des ressources et aussi par
les créneaux universitaires; et finalement, une profession consciente d’elle-même se fonda plus tard
que ses homologues américains ou britanniques. Dans cet article, nous soutenons que l’histoire de
la naissance de l’ingénierie nucléaire canadienne illustre le modelage exceptionnellement marqué de
l’expertise technique par le contexte politique et culturel.
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Introduction
The development of atomic energy has been recounted and analyzed in numer-
ous scholarly and popular publications since 1945. The roles of wartime institu-
tions and historical actors in Canada, however, are frequently subsumed within
accounts of the Manhattan Project and Anglo-Canadian collaboration. Similarly,
the postwar period, during which further exploration of atomic energy and
nuclear power was pursued, has also been assessed from predominantly admin-
istrative, economic and political perspectives. The historiography of Canadian
nuclear energy has ranged from official accounts, to biographies of key scien-
tists, and to national and business histories.2
Accounts are nearly silent, however, on the emergence of the new technical
specialists of this mutating field, particularly in Canada. Owing to secrecy dur-
ing and after the war and distinct national aims for the domain, nuclear engineer-
ing was shaped distinctively in the Canadian context. Alone among the postwar
powers, Canadian exploration of atomic energy eschewed military applications.
The occupation emerged within a governmental monopoly, and the intellectual
content of the discipline was influenced by its early practitioners, administrators,
and university niches. A self-recognized profession coalesced later and in a dif-
ferent form than did its American and British counterparts. Archival sources
reveal the unusual degree to which government institutions (particularly the
National Research Council and its offshoot, Atomic Energy of Canada Ltd)
shaped the new profession. This paper explores the emergence of a distinctively
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Canadian breed of nuclear engineer based on a unique conjunction of technical
expertise, institutional shaping, academic environment, and national context.
I. Scientific and Wartime Background
Nuclear science in Canada, as in other countries, had attracted researchers from
its origins at turn of the century; indeed, the New Zealand physicist Ernest
Rutherford and English chemist Frederick Soddy studied radioactivity at McGill
University in Montreal. Rutherford received a 1908 Nobel Prize for his Montreal
work, which had confirmed that radioactivity signaled the disintegration of
atoms and was characterized by a half-life, or typical decay rate for each type of
atom. Soddy’s own Nobel Prize in 1921 recognized his concept of isotopes as
variants of an element having different atomic weights. Both subsequently
engaged in research in Britain, and Rutherford’s labs nurtured many of the key
participants in nuclear fission and its application in Canada, including John
Cockcroft and W. Bennett Lewis and Canadians George Laurence, David Keys,
and B.W. Sargent.
Serious Canadian involvement in atomic energy was nevertheless a wartime
accident. The discovery of the splitting of uranium atoms (later dubbed fission)
and the corresponding release of energy, confirmed by experiments and analysis
in Germany and published in the British journal Nature in February 1939,
encouraged rapidly mounted investigations by scientists around the world.3 At
the Collège de France in Paris, the team led by Frédéric Joliot and including
Hans Halban and Lew Kowarski demonstrated that this fission usually released
two or more neutrons.4 This detail gave the fission of uranium nuclei not only
scientific but also potential engineering interest: the newly liberated particles
could cause fission of further uranium nuclei in an exponential expansion, lead-
ing to a proportional release of energy. A chain creation — if confirmed —
seemed promising for both power generation and munitions. 
Small and independent groups of physicists began attempts to create a chain
reaction in the laboratory. The National Research Council of Canada (NRC) in
Ottawa was the site of early work: there, physicist George Laurence, later assist-
ed by B. W. Sargent of Queen’s University, began experiments in March 1940 to
investigate the possibility of a nuclear chain reaction. While intensely secret, this
was nevertheless a low priority and low-budget project: the acting president of
the NRC, Chalmers Jack Mackenzie, initially focused NRC attention and fund-
ing on research deemed to be of direct and immediate importance for the war. 
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3 Nuclear physics, a rapidly expanding field during the 1930s, was a genuinely international
subject by the end of the decade, spread in part by the exodus of scientists from Mussolini’s Italy and
Nazi Germany. Researchers in Italy (e.g. Enrico Fermi) and Germany (e.g. Lise Meitner, Otto Hahn,
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Besides Laurence’s in Ottawa, independent experiments began at Columbia
University in New York and Imperial College London. Émigré scientists in the
UK and USA communicated the potential of the chain reaction to their govern-
ments. In Britain, chemist Henry Tizard, responsible for the Scientific Survey of
Air Defence, set up a committee (dubbed MAUD) in April 1940 to investigate
the feasibility of applying nuclear energy, and visited the USA that autumn to
discuss the exchange of military technologies such as radar. Laurence’s work was
discovered in the first fact-finding tour and soon attracted British funding.5
The first MAUD report, provided in March 1941, set the trajectory for
British and Canadian involvement in nuclear energy over the following decades.
The report judged a uranium-based fission explosive and power generation to be
technically feasible. The British report was also crucial in galvanizing American
physicists, who campaigned that autumn for an all-out US development pro-
grame. That October, a committee of the American National Academy brought
together a contingent of physicists and engineers. The American government
decision to fund the atomic bomb project was guided by two highly placed
administrators who subsequently played an indirect role in defining its Canadian
workers and the scope of their activities. Vannevar Bush, directing a new coor-
dinating body, the Office of Scientific Research and Development (OSRD), and
James B. Conant, then president of Harvard University and chair of the National
Defense Research Committee (NDRC), assumed a wide-ranging set of responsi-
bilities that included the atomic bomb development project. Bush, supported by
Conant, reported directly to Franklin Roosevelt and had essentially unlimited
access to resources for wartime research and development.6
This state-funded scientific project was expanded by a forced marriage. In
June 1942, project control was passed to an American Army organization dubbed
the Manhattan Engineer District and directed by General Leslie Groves. Most
crucially for incubating a new technical elite, engineering development was
passed to corporations including Du Pont, General Electric, and Westinghouse.
Following a meeting between Winston Churchill and Roosevelt, the two coun-
tries agreed to collaborate, with the bulk of research and development to be sited
in the USA.
While the American effort was beginning in new secret towns, work contin-
ued in British university and industrial labs. The MAUD committee was super-
seded by a new “Tube Alloys Directorate” in the autumn of 1941, a division of
the Department of Scientific and Industrial Research (DSIR) attached to the
Ministry of Supply. Even before Groves’s call to American corporations, the
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MAUD committee had recognized the necessity for industrial collaborations.
The committee relied on the two British companies that were large enough to
support research staff, and to have the knowledge and industrial capacity for the
planned work: Imperial Chemical Industries (ICI) and Metropolitan-Vickers. 
Unlike its American counterparts, ICI had emphasised the importance of
“power production in peace and war,” and argued in appendices to the MAUD
report that “the present ideas and research work should be developed by a firm
in the United Kingdom for the British Empire, whatever may be done in other
parts of the world.”7 Its senior managers judged Hans Halban’s scheme for a
“nuclear energy machine” to be the most feasible, but since it required some 20
tons of heavy-water and an equivalent amount of purified uranium, they argued
that Canada, with known supplies of uranium ore, would be a logical partner.8
It was equally obvious to administrators that the resources to achieve these
goals would be difficult to obtain in wartime Britain, which did not have ade-
quate resources to refine uranium on an adequate scale. Although Tube Alloys
initially disdained collaboration with the American groups, the project turned
gradually towards complementary and associated tasks with its neighbour.
During the preceding year, though, the American groups had made substantial
progress and, under the Army’s management, were now reticent to accept foreign
collaboration, particularly because of suspicion about the involvement of ICI, a
major international competitor for American companies. Consequently Canada
was needed not merely as partner to provide raw materials, but also host.
Negotiations in early 1942 resulted in physicists and engineers at British univer-
sities and ICI moving en masse to Montreal under Hans Halban in early 1943.
Broadly speaking, then, a Canadian locus was a consequence of British appre-
hension of invasion, American security concerns, and Anglo-Canadian determi-
nation to remain part of the project.
II. Canada and the “Heavy-Water Boiler”9
The peculiar wartime context, melding secrecy, high strategic importance, and
disparate scientific and engineering expertise, provided the conditions to grow
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for a Bomb, Appendix VII: Nuclear energy as a source of power,” in Gowing, Britain and Atomic
Energy, pp. 433-36.
8 ICI’s own postwar plans for research and power generation are further detailed in “ICI
Progress Reports (General Chemistry Division) 1941-43,” UK National Archives [formerly Public
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P.V. Auger, H.H. Halban, R.E. Newell, F.A. Paneth, and G. Placszek, “Research programs for deve-
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journal 44-3.qxp  1/8/2010  8:56 AM  Page 439
both a new subject and a new profession. The emergence of Canadian nuclear
research and a distinct definition of nuclear engineers were influenced strongly
by the working cultures of the National Research Council of Canada (NRC) and
Imperial Chemical Industries (ICI). Both organizations were amenable to a con-
genial alliance between engineers and scientists. Moreover, the Canadian
involvement was overseen and administered by a handful of individuals who
combined engineering experience with civil service connections. The shaping of
the project, its personnel, and postwar ambitions proved contingent on their
backgrounds and interactions.
Just as important, the project was actively supported at the highest govern-
ment levels. The Canadian government accepted the British request to host
aspects of the Tube Alloys Project, offering to pay all project costs except the
salaries of its participants from Britain. In the spring of 1942, Canada’s Minister
of Munitions and Supply, C.D. Howe, himself an engineer, consulted C.J.
Mackenzie — also a civil engineer and senior academic before joining the NRC
— as the most senior scientific administrator to oversee the work. For
Mackenzie, the new project was accepted matter-of-factly as a wartime require-
ment having potential postwar consequences. It fit well with the Council’s man-
date of “fostering the scientific development of Canadian industry for Canadian
needs and for the extension and expansion of Canadian trade at home and
abroad.”10 That autumn, Howe assigned Lesslie R. Thomson, a mechanical engi-
neer and pre-war professor of civil and fuel engineering at two Canadian univer-
sities, as administrator and liaison officer.11
The personnel staffing the organization were a distinctly twentieth-century
collection of scientists, engineers and technicians The effort by specialists to
marry scientific research with economically valuable outcomes was becoming
familiar in the national standards laboratories that appeared at the turn of the cen-
tury — the Physikalisch Technische Reichsanstalt in Germany (1887), the
National Physical Laboratory in Britain (1900), and the National Bureau of
Standards in the USA (1901) — and in industrial laboratories (such as those of
General Electric, Kodak, Bell, and Westinghouse in the USA, and GEC, British
Thomson-Houston, and Metropolitan Vickers in Britain). In these environments,
neither science nor engineering had a permanent position in the hierarchy of sta-
tus and power: either could assume ascendancy depending on the task at hand.
The administration of the NRC advanced this professional demographic.
Neither of Mackenzie’s predecessors — Henry M. Tory, an educator responsible
for founding several Canadian universities, or General Andrew McNaughton,
trained as an engineer and responsible for modernizing the Canadian Army —
had engaged in research themselves, but each had a record of promoting it in
other contexts. Founded in 1916, the National Research Council had played pri-
marily an advisory role for the Canadian government through the 1920s. During
that period, it informed policy, surveyed Canadian research strengths, funding
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committees to investigate specific problems, and provided university fellow-
ships. Although founded ostensibly to coordinate and promote scientific and
industrial research, it soon discovered that there was little to promote. Canada, it
seemed, was a country focused on application: when the NRC was founded,
there were an estimated fifty scientists engaged in so-called pure research.12
Under Tory, however, who oversaw the completion of research laboratories
in Ottawa in 1932, the organization began to conduct more applied research of
its own in the national interest. His “Temple of Science” was populated with
some fifty scientists and engineers during the Depression years, working almost
exclusively on industrial problems. As a Crown Corporation, the NRC was not a
Department of Government, and its staff organization did not always conform to
Civil Service norms; indeed, many staff worked without pay during the
Depression. Nor was the organization modeled closely on universities. The first
reorganization in 1929 created a Division of Physics and Engineering, lumping
together fields that in other institutions were held more firmly apart.13 Under
McNaughton’s four-year direction to 1939, staff doubled, and working culture
remained firmly oriented towards scientific-engineering collaborations. And dur-
ing his own tenure, when staff reached over 2,000, C.J. Mackenzie sought to
maintain “the realistic view which all members of the staff here take. We all feel
keenly that unless our endeavours produce equipment and findings … we will
not be achieving our fundamental purpose.”14 This merging of scientific and
engineering interests was unique, and of particular value for the development of
a new field and specialist workers. In the USA, by contrast, the Manhattan
Project scientists balked at collaboration with engineers; in Britain, the Tube
Alloys work was relatively segregated between university laboratories and the
industrial sites of ICI.
Although he knew something of the British nuclear work from previous vis-
its by John Cockcroft, Mackenzie first met Sir George Thomson, Chair of the
MAUD committee, and Wallace Akers, the Director of Tube Alloys, in February
1942.15 He warmed to Akers immediately as an engineer like himself.
Mackenzie’s diary entries characterize Akers, the Research Director of ICI and
now head of Tube Alloys, as “an extraordinarily able and impressive man. He is
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sound scientifically and has a very pleasant personality and practical sense. He
has extensive industrial experience also.” Tube Alloys represented just the kind
of project that Mackenzie’s NRC aspired to undertake. It promised economic
benefits along with a strong component of international science. Mackenzie was
correspondingly impressed with the British plans for the project, “talking in
terms of very large plants — something in the vicinity of 40 or 50 million dollar
plants and if it is successful will be one of the most spectacular things of the
war.”16 Following further visits from a half-dozen members of Tube Alloys
(Mackenzie referring to “the very hush hush project” alternately in his diary as
“the uranium business,” “problem S-1,” the “U project,” “the radiological prob-
lem,” and “the corrosion project”), Lesslie Thomson began seeking a Canadian
base for the operation. 
During late 1942, the first few members of the group were accommodated
in a Montreal house, but a more suitable location was found March 1943, in an
empty wing of the newly constructed hospital of the University of Montreal.
Over the following months the Montreal Laboratory was populated with a grow-
ing number of technical workers. With the group of French workers came a stock
of heavy-water produced in Norway via Joliot’s lab, which had been transported
to Cambridge in May 1940 after the fall of France.17 The Montreal Laboratory
team was cosmopolitan, consisting of the French and British scientists but also
engineers seconded from ICI and equivalent Canadian personnel from the NRC
and universities. Still other design engineers were recruited from the Central
Register in the UK, but Wallace Akers noted that “the Canadians, who have been
found for us, are of a very high standard indeed.”18
Managing the new cluster of workers nevertheless presented difficulties,
with scientists identified as the source of problems rather than solutions. The
leaders of the project — C.D. Howe, C.J. Mackenzie, Lesslie Thomson, Wallace
Akers, and the scientific leader of the team, Hans Halban — remained embroiled
not just in the administrative and political details of the Canadian project through
the war, but also its scientific dimensions. And for each of them, all except
Halban an engineer by training, the importance of collaboration between scien-
tific research and engineering expertise was a perennial theme. The same insight
came to the American administrators, too. Following a meeting with Akers,
Mackenzie commiserated, 
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16 C.J. Mackenzie, 19 February 1942 diary, LAC MG30-B122 Vol. 1.
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I gather that things are not going so well in certain parts of the
American program as the groups of physicists, particularly at
Chicago, do not realize the wisdom of calling in engineers
when it comes to plant design etc. These high grade physicists
sit around for hours discussing problems which are to be
solved in the first chapter of elementary engineering texts.
They are beginning to realize that in the States now and are
beginning to correct it. In other of the projects engineers from
the Kellogg Co. and the Dupont Co. have been called in early
in the game and these projects are going very well.19
Meeting James Conant of the American NDRC a few weeks later,
Mackenzie gained the same perspective:
Conant was quite concerned about the whole work and said
that it was very difficult to get a sound opinion as to the mer-
its of the various projects. He said that his difficulty was to get
the opinion of a detached nuclear physicist… He agrees with
Akers’ contention that it is largely an engineering development
or at least the major difficulties will be engineering…They
have now a special committee investigating all the projects
from an engineering standpoint. The subcommittee is really a
group of Dupont engineers.20
But where Du Pont was a central, if resented, player in American develop-
ments, ICI was accommodated readily into Anglo-Canadian work. An important
reason for the difference was the early responsibility allocated to the company by
the Tube Alloys Project. By late 1943 Tube Alloys managed 276 research work-
ers: 30 at Birmingham University, 23 at Cambridge, 22 at Oxford, 10 at
Liverpool, and 67 at the Montreal Laboratory.21 ICI staff, accounting for 93 of
the total, remained intimately involved, and by September of that year their rep-
resentatives had joined the Technical Sub-Committee.22 As the largest and
widest-ranging chemical manufacturer in the UK, ICI was involved in every
aspect of the early developmental work. Via its fertilizer and synthetic products
division at Billingham in the northeast, the General Chemicals and Alkali
Divisions in the northeast, and the Metals Division in the Midlands, the compa-
ny during the war studied production processes for heavy-water, produced the
chemicals for the pilot diffusion plant and uranium metal for the first test reac-
tors, supervised the production of special membranes for the model diffusion
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units, and operated them.23 The high proportion of ICI engineers in the Anglo-
Canadian program consequently flavoured its working culture.
In the Montreal group, however, scientists initially gained the most influen-
tial roles. From March 1943, forty UK-based professionals worked at the
Montreal Lab, notably Head of Engineering, Ronald E. Newell; Head of Physics,
Pierre Auger; Head of Theoretical Physics, George Placzek, and Head of
Chemistry, Friedrich Paneth. However, industrial expertise and science were
closely associated in exploring the new field. As Newell summarized it, the
assembled group was constructing a new field of expertise — but one closer to
engineering than to science:
Owing to the unusual nature of the work the great majority of
the additional staff did not have the full specialized knowledge
necessary and a period of training was required. In the case of
engineering, for example, this meant development of a com-
pletely new branch of engineering... a great deal of new knowl-
edge had to be acquired by the engineers and to some extent
this has also applied to the theoretical and experimental
physics sections and the chemistry section.24
It is not a coincidence that Newell identified the engineering as similar to his
own background in industrial chemistry and power generation.25 This catego-
rization of essential attributes was repeated by other administrators responsible
for nuclear specialists through the 1950s. Newell’s words were echoed in the
war-end summary of the American project:
Evidently the operation of a full-scale plant of the type
planned would require a large and highly skilled group of oper-
ators. Although du Pont had a tremendous background of expe-
rience in the operation of various kinds of chemical plant, this
was something new and it was evident that operating person-
nel would need special training.26
The unusually close collaboration of scientists and engineers in the
Canadian context was an important factor in creating a national identity for
nuclear specialists. Another was intellectual isolation: the growing nucleus was
cloistered. While engineering was identified as central to the Anglo-Canadian
444 SEAN F. JOHNSTON
23 W.J. Reader, Imperial Chemical Industries: A History (Oxford, 1975), Vol. 2, pp. 287-96.
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25 Newell had been chief engineer of the Billingham Power Station in Durham, England, and
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project, there was relatively little for engineers to do at the Montreal Laboratory.
Detailed design work, construction, and testing were in abeyance because, as
Mackenzie had suspected, the Americans were reluctant to provide the necessary
heavy-water and uranium for Hans Halban’s group to build a chain-reacting
pile.27 American administrators continued to distrust the broad European back-
grounds at the Montreal Lab; as Mackenzie summarized it, 
the Montreal group… is really not an Anglo-Saxon group,
and… they felt there was no guarantee that the various nation-
als — French, Austrian, Russian, Czecho-Slovakian, German,
Italian, etc. could be guaranteed for any length of time. I think
there is a great deal to be said for their point of view.28
Groves, Conant, and Bush were equally uneasy about UK involvement in
what they saw as an American development project. The commercial risks also
unsettled them. Wallace Akers, the Director of Tube Alloys, was a senior mem-
ber of ICI staff; his deputy and senior engineers were all seconded ICI employ-
ees, and their company had promoted a potential postwar British nuclear indus-
try in the MAUD report. 
As a result, the Montreal group found itself increasingly excluded from
American information, with its members pleading for action by the Canadian
administrators and pursuing increasingly arcane, but still unverifiable, theoreti-
cal studies. As one of the Canadian members recalled, “it was science in a clos-
et. So we worked more or less in our separate corners. Under stress, we could not
afford the luxury of seeing the broad picture, and became technicians in our sep-
arate cells.”29 Without adequate supplies of uranium or heavy-water, and isolat-
ed from experimental findings from the USA, technical workers at the Montreal
Lab consequently developed a local Canadian variant of nuclear knowledge,
devoting most of their effort to theoretical studies of chain-reactor designs based
on heavy-water.30 Internal security, too, inhibited interdisciplinary collaboration;
as one member recalled, “hierarchy prevailed, and the atmosphere was in some
ways more military than academic.”31
Collaboration with the American program improved but remained difficult.
The information flow to the American groups was aided by a military liaison
officer, except for a brief period in late 1943 when Mackenzie and Akers, exas-
perated at the stonewalling by Groves, Conant, and Bush, restricted the Montreal
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28 C.J. Mackenzie, 18 January 1943 diary, LAC MG30-B122-Vol. 1.
29 Philip R. Wallace to M.M.R. Williams, letter, 21 July 2000, SFJ collection.
30 Michael M.R. Williams, “The Development of Nuclear Reactor Theory in the Montreal
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group from scientific contact with their American counterparts. A direct discus-
sion between Churchill and Roosevelt at Quebec in August 1943 led eventually
to some relaxation of American restrictions. Nevertheless, as Mackenzie fumed
a month later, General Groves was “the dominant personality in the US group”
and “in effect a dictator” whose “idea of collaboration seems to be to incorporate
into the US project such sections of the British team as seem likely to promote a
speedier and more certain realization of project.”32 The Montreal-based workers
had had frustratingly little contact with their American counterparts until late
1943, during which time American capability had developed rapidly. Isolation
thus shaped and consolidated the Canadian work: intellectually segregated, the
Anglo-Canadian team diverged increasingly from Manhattan Project goals.
The decision in early 1944 to build a pile and chemical plants in Canada for
heavy-water production and plutonium separation therefore was an effort to shift
the centre of mass from the USA, and to transfer the project gradually from
British to Canadian governance.33 Like the American wartime installations at
Argonne, Illinois (reactor design and testing), Hanford, Washington (large reac-
tors to generate plutonium), Oak Ridge, Tennessee (separation factories to pro-
duce the radioactive isotope of uranium), and Los Alamos, New Mexico (bomb
design and testing), the chosen Canadian site, Chalk River in southern Ontario,
was placed far from population centres both for security reasons and to accom-
modate the engineering uncertainties of explosion or accidental release of
radioactive materials.34 At Chalk River, physicist John Cockcroft took over from
Hans Halban the direction of the British/Canadian team to design the first reac-
tor outside the USA.35 It became operational in September 1945, four weeks
after the Hiroshima and Nagasaki bombs were dropped.36
The separation between the American, British, and Canadian goals in the
Manhattan Project is illustrated by the bombings of Japan. For the Chalk River
group, focused on reactor theory, preparing to test the first Canadian reactor, and
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proposing British developments in the months ahead, the use of the bombs was
marked by relatively little reaction. Cockcroft had spent the weeks preceding the
Japanese events writing a scientific account of chain reacting systems for Lord
Cherwell, and the month before that was devoted to a memo outlining postwar
possibilities for generating power.37 On the other hand, more senior administra-
tors prepared to publicize unity of purpose. NRC Director C.J. Mackenzie, on
vacation during the bombings in early August, returned to his desk to pen con-
gratulatory letters to Groves, Bush, Conant, and Chadwick.38 And, also with
Mackenzie’s drafting, the Canadian government publicized the wartime collabo-
ration within days of the news of the bombings of Japan.39
Despite surface collaboration, however, this was clearly an unequal partner-
ship. The American dominance of the Canadian project and influence on its spe-
cialist workers is illustrated by actions during the last months of the war. General
Groves had complained of a trip by Hans Halban to liberated France in
December 1944 during which he met with his colleague Frédéric Joliot, a known
Communist. Halban’s imperious and secretive manner had ruined his relation-
ships with his Anglo-Canadian co-workers, and the trip seemed to vindicate the
decision taken eight months earlier to replace him as project leader. John
Cockcroft, his replacement, had a reputation with both the Americans and British
as a quietly efficient and tenacious administrator, comfortable with
engineering/scientific collaboration and its civil service management.40
Groves also was suspicious of later requests by other members of the French
contingent, Bertrand Goldschmidt, Lew Kowarski, and Jules Guéron to visit
France in April 1945 to discuss their eventual redeployment with Joliot in a post-
war French nuclear institution.41 In September 1945, Groves demanded that the
remaining French members of the Montreal Lab/Chalk River team be excluded
from what was now a postwar project. With only token protest, C.J. Mackenzie
complied, and the French departed by the end of the year.42 James Chadwick, the
British discoverer of the neutron, argued to Mackenzie that “this consequence is
inevitable” and that he was “not prepared so seriously to prejudice our agreement
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on collaboration with the U. S. in order to relieve a temporary embarrassment.”43
An unsigned memo from one of the senior Chalk River staff, however, com-
plained bitterly about the loss of Goldschmidt, who had led their chemistry
research:
The morale of our chemists has always been adversely
affected by the lack of exchange of information. We have been
forced to do work which we know has been done already. The
“purging” of the leader of the group can hardly be expected to
make for improved morale.
In spite of the fact that the chemistry of 49 [i.e. plutonium]
was well worked out, we were given little information other
than a few vague hints from time to time. The result has been
that we have been obliged with a group of about 40 men to do
what the Americans did with several thousand….The position
therefore is that the “high command” refuse to give us help on
49 Chemistry, and as soon as we are well on the way to doing
the job for ourselves insist on firing the man who has directed
the work….
Finally, I should like to point out that we have always been
treated as the poor relation in this project, and I anticipate great
difficulty in attracting good men to the project unless we can
reach an international position which enables us to have some
self respect.44
Jules Guéron, for his part, asked reasonably, if meekly, for “clear cut indica-
tions as to the nature and extent of the secrecy regulations to which I am still
committed,” and what he would be able to take to the new French Commissariat
à l’Énergie Atomique.45 The French program was to remain isolated from work
in the USA, Canada, and Britain after the war, largely because of the pro-com-
munist allegiances of key workers such as Joliot. But such security concerns
were to remain problematic for Canadian workers, too, inhibiting both collabo-
ration and independence through the 1950s. The American influence thus shaped
the composition of Canada’s interdisciplinary teams of nuclear specialists. 
This administratively-decreed separation helped to create a proto-profession
along clearer national lines. In the USA, foreign nuclear workers were quick to
adopt American citizenship, particularly in light of suspicions of their alle-
giances; Eugene Wigner, Edward Teller, Leo Szilárd, and Enrico Fermi were
prominent examples between 1937 and 1944.46 Postwar contributions to nuclear
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research and development in Germany, on the other hand, were actively stifled
by the prohibition of such activities by the Allied powers.47
The episode surrounding the French scientists highlights the issue of respect
and comparative judgements of national contributions to the project, which were
only hinted at publicly. These, too, influenced national differences in the nascent
profession. For example, Arthur Compton, director of the Met Lab which had
been responsible for designing American wartime reactors, commented a decade
later that “Canada’s principal contributions to the atomic project during the war
were the mining of uranium ore in the Great Bear Lake region and the supplying
of needed uranium materials.”48 The on-again, off-again cooperation, soured by
security concerns, mistrust about postwar commercialisation, and dismissive
judgements, played its part in accentuating distinct national identities for nuclear
engineers.
III. Chalk River for Canadians
At war’s end, the Anglo-Canadian project at Chalk River offered the most propi-
tious international site for continued nuclear research. As the Little Boy and Fat
Man bombs were dropped on Japan, the first Canadian pile was in its final stages
of preparation.  The American centres, with their uneasy merging of industrial
expertise with academic scientists, had no immediate plans beyond the
Manhattan Project; Britain was developing plans for research and atomic bomb
development, but as yet had no centres. By contrast, Chalk River was just com-
ing into its own. Despite the repatriation of many of the non-Canadian partici-
pants, C.J. Mackenzie was impressed by how easily workers at the National
Research Council, and its Chalk River staff, made the transition from wartime to
peacetime activities.49 This continuity, aided by the heterogeneous profile of
committed scientific and engineering personnel, undoubtedly gave the
Canadians an early postwar advantage over their British and even American
counterparts. 
Dominated by security concerns, the postwar environment rapidly differen-
tiated the new subject of nuclear engineering in each country. The fitful wartime
Manhattan Project collaboration between the UK, USA, and Canada shaped their
respective postwar programs. In part to encourage further sharing of information,
Anglo-Canadian administrators had given American counterparts unfettered
access to information in 1944 and 1945. As administrator Lesslie Thompson
reported, a “Special Secret Committee” established in February 1945 allowed
“the Trust, US Military Intelligence and the like to have direct information on
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what was being done in Canada… In addition, secret reports on the work done
in Canadian laboratories on the development and improvements in analytical
techniques and so on have been circulated.”50 Yet even this lopsided openness
began to disappear within months. A secret cable immediately after the Japanese
bombings defined postwar US censorship policy:
Nothing may be written, discussed or used in any media of
publication on the following.
- Specific processes, formulas and mechanics of operation.
- Stocks, location of stocks, procurement of stocks and stock
consumption.
- Quality and quantity of production of active material.
- Physical characteristics of the weapon and methods of using
it.
- Speculation in the future development of the processes for
military purposes.
- Information as to the relative importance of the various meth-
ods or plants or of their relative functions or efficiencies.51
The policy censored more than bomb-making. In effect, it capped the frag-
ile young field of nuclear engineering. C.J. Mackenzie and John Cockcroft rather
helplessly recommended that Canada and the UK follow the same policy.
The 1946 McMahon Act in the USA even more dramatically closed off
sources of information and personnel to the new British and Canadian programs.
No British or Canadian workers had been permitted to visit the Hanford site —
the most secret of American installations — and the design principles and prac-
ticalities of its plutonium-producing piles were learned piecemeal and second-
hand. Not only was expertise still secret; it had to be reinvented at each national
site and passed on by unformalized routes.
The McMahon Act further restricted the formal release of information.
Mackenzie complained to C.D. Howe that information flow was in one direction
only: the Americans released information to the Canadian company Eldorado
about uranium processing in exchange for badly-needed raw ore, but “in spite of
a strong case and an active campaign for cooperation on the part of the American
group on reactor design, up to the present time we have had no concessions what-
soever.”52
Canadian access to postwar American sites was further restricted. Beginning
in 1948, requests by Canadian scientists to attend training courses on isotopes at
Oak Ridge had to be channelled from Chalk River successively to the
Department of External Affairs, the Canadian Ambassador in Washington, and
the US State Department, which then sought security clearance from the FBI,
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because the Americans mistrusted Canadian security procedures.53 One outcome
of the diplomatic and security obstructions was a tightening of security regula-
tions in Canada and at Chalk River in particular. The site retained its wartime sta-
tus as a closed facility accessible only to cleared visitors. As interest grew, secu-
rity rose: the Canadian press was refused access, and the editor of Nucleonics
Magazine, the first American publication in the field, was even more summarily
dismissed.54 The clamp-down apparently surprised and insulted British col-
leagues, too. David Keys, vice president of the project, was compelled to reas-
sure John Cockcroft that the clearance procedures applied equally to British,
Americans, and Canadians.55
As a consequence, the postwar context and new forms of technological cen-
sorship curtailed international collaboration and accelerated intellectual diver-
gence. In the months after the war, the truly international Montreal Group had
been filtered into an Anglo-Canadian team, as French workers were dismissed
under American pressure. With the subsequent McMahon Act, American collab-
oration ceased even before British nuclear workers had all been repatriated from
Canada. And as “atomic spy” fears escalated, security restrictions divided even
the Canadians and British.56 The atomic energy projects became increasingly
isolated, screwed down, and incestuous on the national scale.
While security threatened to stifle the new field of atomic energy in all three
countries, so too did lack of expertise. With the sudden departure of the French
workers at the end of the war and the more gradual planned transferral of most
of the British workers, the Montreal Laboratory was closed in June 1946, with
all remaining employees relocated to Chalk River. Most of those British workers
went to the new Atomic Energy Research Establishment at Harwell, directed by
John Cockcroft.57 Despite the appeal of atomic energy, new Canadian workers,
deterred by secrecy and relatively underpaid posts, were hard to attract to the
geographically isolated Chalk River.
Cockcroft, sounded out about accepting the new post in April 1945, accept-
ed the directorship that October. His sudden recall to Britain led to an anxious
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search for a Canadian replacement. The best candidate, Walter Zinn, who had
worked closely with Fermi in Chicago’s Met Lab on reactor design during the
war, declined the offer from Mackenzie despite assurances that “the Chalk River
project will be completely divorced from petty political interference, and the
staff is not under the Civil Service Commission nor its control vested in any
department of Government.” Mackenzie further confided:
We are particularly anxious to get a Canadian-born director, as
the project is going to be completely Canadian in every
respect. We will probably have in the future British teams of
scientists who come to us as visitors, but there will be
absolutely no administrative control or direction from Britain
and the teams will be at Chalk River as guests and we hope
teams from the United States will be there in the same capaci-
ty.58
In reality, the NRC Director was aware of hemorrhaging staff levels at Chalk
River and the difficulty of engaging competent replacements owing to salary lev-
els lower than in the USA. The incentives were not merely financial, though:
Zinn intimated that “the Americans put terrific pressure on him, pointing out that
he was the only man with experience in designing and operating medium-sized
piles, that he had been in the American show from the start, knew all the inside
dope, and had a responsibility, particularly as he had become a naturalised citi-
zen.”59 Although Mackenzie’s claims to Zinn made a strong case for a unique
Canadian perspective on atomic energy development, instead he accepted W.
Bennett Lewis, a British nuclear physicist who had directed radar work at the Air
Ministry Establishment during the war, to succeed Cockcroft as Director of
Research. 
With the evaporation of the Montreal Laboratory and its unique collabora-
tive team, Chalk River became the home of what was now referred to as the
“Atomic Energy Project,” under the wing of the National Research Council. The
return of some of the wartime scientists to their academic posts meant that Chalk
River could more coherently support the integration of science and engineering
specialists. For Mackenzie, it fulfilled a desire to model postwar Canadian
research on what he saw as wartime British and American models. As Chair of
the War Technical and Scientific Development Committee, he had argued in
1943 that “Canada should have strong research groups tied in to the related
industries which also should maintain research establishments,” and that “the
UK appreciates the value of research and has established a large number of
research stations under the Admiralty, the Ministry of Aircraft Production, the
Dept of Scientific and Industrial Research, etc and has appropriated very large
sums for their activities. In the US also very large amounts are being spent on
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scientific research.” In short, the theme of Chalk River would be government-
funded, large scale research — a kind of super powered National Research
Council.
In fact, the postwar Atomic Energy Project began to dominate the NRC
budget and administration. Moreover, it seemed ripe for transition from research
to a more immediate application — even if that application was not yet identi-
fied. Mackenzie noted that “atomic energy developments are at the stage where
venture money will pay the same sort of dividends as did radar and our other war
activities.”60 As a result, in 1952 a new Crown Corporation, Atomic Energy of
Canada Limited (AECL), took over the responsibility from the NRC of shep-
herding these activities. Mackenzie shifted roles, resigning from Directorship of
the NRC to lead the new organization until his retirement in 1953. The Canadian
government took the opportunity to further consolidate activities: the new presi-
dent of AECL was W.J. Bennett, Director of Eldorado Mining and Refining,
which had been nationalized as a Crown Corporation in 1944 as the principal
supplier of uranium to the Allies, and was later to merge with AECL itself. 
IV. A Canadian Style of Development
The new organization could more actively promote a new field, new design prin-
ciples, and new specialists. Chalk River’s initial responsibility was reactor
design, and the single-minded focus on heavy-water reactors offered a promising
development program. The first Canadian reactor, the ZEEP (Zero Energy
Experimental Pile), had been conceived in 1944 as a small-scale information-
gathering reactor. It provided the experience necessary for a much larger heavy-
water reactor, the NRX (National Research Experimental, 1947), which became
the most intense international source of neutrons into the 1950s and so an impor-
tant resource for the British and American researchers, too.61
The various trade-offs relied on understandings beyond the ken of conven-
tional engineers. Engineering decisions based on nuclear knowledge had pro-
found effects on design. The Canadian heavy-water reactors highlighted a dis-
tinctive design aesthetic that had been inherited from the scarcity of resources
and cloistered research during the war: what W. B. Lewis called “neutron econ-
omy.”62 He argued that, given the expense and possibly limited supply of urani-
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um, it was necessary to employ every possible neutron for useful production of
fissions, heat, and electrical power. 
Design elegance was a luxury that Canadian engineers uniquely could
afford. Unlike postwar Britain and the USA, Canada did not pursue atomic ener-
gy for weapons development — or at least not directly. As NRC director
Mackenzie noted to James Chadwick, “our government has suggested that they
are not interested in work on the bomb, and we in Canada have never received a
particle of information in connection therewith.”63 Nevertheless, as the wartime
Montreal Laboratory members had realized, their heavy-water reactors would
generate plutonium at least as well as their American graphite-based counter-
parts. Plutonium production was the sole purpose for the American Hanford piles
and the postwar British Windscale piles. Plutonium could itself be used to power
reactors, but it also had a high economic value in the postwar period, when the
Americans and British were struggling to produce quantities sufficient for a mil-
itarily useful stockpile of atomic weapons. For Canadian designers, even more
than their former British colleagues, this value was explicit and readily calculat-
ed: Mackenzie, first as president of the NRC and subsequently as president of
AECL, secretly negotiated a price for Chalk River plutonium with the
Americans, and approved only miserly research samples for the British. The
original negotiated deal agreed that the USA would “buy all plutonium produced
at Chalk River at a price between $170,000 and $180,000 per kilogram.” C.D.
Howe briefed the Canadian Finance Minister that “a price of $145,000 per kilo-
gram will permit the government to amortize the new plant over ten years, and…
a price of $175,000 per kilogram would allow the Government to amortize past
expenditure as well as future expenditures over the same period.”64 Thus the
next-generation NRU reactor (“National Research Universal”) and plutonium
separation plants were designed specifically with the intention of funding their
operation and, it was hoped, the entire Canadian program, by sales of plutonium.
Awash with research money, Canadian nuclear workers remained ignorant of the
supporting economics.65
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More openly, Chalk River reactors produced two other products of scientif-
ic and economic value. First, they generated intense fields of neutrons, which
could be used to irradiate materials to test the effects of radiation and so devel-
op biological and engineering applications for atomic energy.66 Access to irradi-
ation experiments could be bartered and sold internationally. Second, this irradi-
ation by neutrons generated new radioactive isotopes that could be used for
applications such as tracers in medical diagnosis and sources for radiation thera-
py. Both applications attracted visiting researchers, generated income, and boost-
ed national status.67
But who guided the research goals, and to what end? While reactor research
was expected to yield fundamentally new scientific information, it fitted poorly
with pre-war scientific culture, in which Canadian projects had been small and
short-term. Chalk River promoted an open-ended form of science on the indus-
trial scale, but commercial applications initially were unclear. Design principles
and scientific insights would remain secret, being disseminated tardily, if ever, in
the open scientific literature.68 How, then, could the Crown corporation serve
Canadian science and industry?
Chalk River, like its American and British equivalents, pursued unclear
objectives in its postwar atomic energy program. While the prospect of generat-
ing useful electrical power was recognized, none of the institutions promoted this
as a realistic goal during the immediate postwar years.69 Instead, in each coun-
try the state-funded labs were protected by an umbrella of secrecy and made
responsible for investigating the potential of atomic energy. Strategic applica-
tions were nevertheless evident. In the USA, the Navy became an early client for
propulsion systems, and, in Britain, bomb development absorbed resources. At
Chalk River, by contrast, the shunning of military applications and sponsorship
placed the Canadian Atomic Energy Project in a more precarious but curiously
favoured position, protected by the status afforded by the new field and by the
seductive but intangible promises of future applications. Indeed, this period, with
little governmental interference and “scientific self-government,” was referred to
by some Canadian workers as “the Golden Age.”70
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Given this unique combination of cosseted yet unfettered research direc-
tions, Canadian workers were remarkably diffident in their early predictions. As
in the National Research Council from which it sprang, Chalk River technolo-
gists and scientists could coexist, exploring both fundamental questions and
novel engineering directions.71 Short-term goals were neither appealing nor
pressing. As the vice president and most senior scientific advisor to the project,
David Keys damped down the enthusiasm of one correspondent in 1951:
I believe it will be many years before power will be developed
by such a process for commercial uses. When such plants are
constructed, they will probably find application in special
places where it is difficult to obtain power by any of the usual
methods…My personal opinion is that nuclear power will be
achieved but will supplement rather than replace any of our
conventional sources.72
Ideas circulated but without taking root. As C.J. Mackenzie, at the helm of
the Canadian activities, mused, it was a matter of confidence and politics as
much as technological trajectory:
Living in a young country where we are inclined to be
optimistic, we feel that even with our present piles we are get-
ting valuable operating experience every day, and by the time
we have five more years’ experience on our production piles
and have available the results of development work now under
way, we should know a great deal about power units a few
years after the first one starts to operate.
I do not believe it is of fundamental importance to try and
set the date at which we can say we will enter the atomic power
age. In my opinion, any such date can never be identified. The
whole development will be a gradual one. In 1952 the most
important thing, in my opinion, is to get a power production
pile into operation at the earliest possible moment. If our
statesmen and politicians get the idea that the useful applica-
tion of atomic power is still half a century away, it will make
it very difficult to get the financial support we need right
now.73
Mackenzie’s proposal to C.D. Howe urging the Canadian government to hail the
coming of nuclear power was halted temporarily by the first major nuclear acci-
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dent: the overheating and radioactive breaching of the NRX reactor in December
1952.74
Only in 1954 did Chalk River administrators, still focused on the NRX
research reactor and its pending successor, the NRU, commit themselves to
developing nuclear power generation. David Keys, as scientific advisor to the
president of AECL, observed that a feasibility project involving Canadian power
companies (notably the Ontario Hydro Electric Power Commission) had begun,
and needed to be seen to be in the game:
In view of the fact that both the Americans and British are pro-
ceeding with the construction of plants to produce reasonable
quantities of electrical energy from nuclear fission, it is impor-
tant that Canada should also be considering such possibilities,
since our scientists and engineers have made a very successful
contributions to nuclear pile operations.75
These activities were again prompted, if not directed, by external decision-
making. In 1955, exactly a decade after the war’s end, the curtain of secrecy was
raised: the International Conference on the Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy was
held in Geneva. This was the outcome of a political initiative by President
Dwight Eisenhower in 1953, “Atoms for Peace,” intended to turn American
attention away from the loss of the nuclear weapon monopoly to the USSR and
Britain. The Geneva conference, though, represented more than a commemora-
tion or political act; at the level of nuclear workers, it witnessed a collective
release of tension that was genuine and uncynical. Security concerns reduced sig-
nificantly, and international sharing of nuclear knowledge was liberated after a
decade of secrecy. It also marked and promoted the first serious attempts to cre-
ate a new industry. The following year, the Calder Hall power station, the first
significant and widely publicized civilian application of nuclear power, was
completed next to the Windscale piles in Britain.76 For each of the former allies,
the wide-ranging atomic energy projects were recast as more focused nuclear
power programs. 
In this more open and commercially-oriented environment, W. B. Lewis
became the champion of nuclear power in the Canadian program, later dubbed
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CANDU.77 In early 1962, Canada’s first pilot nuclear power station, the NPD
(“Nuclear Power Demonstration”), went critical in Rolphton, Ontario, just upriv-
er from Chalk River itself. A joint project of AECL, the Hydro Electric Power
Commission of Ontario, and Canadian General Electric, the NPD was the indi-
cator of another phase change: the Atomic Energy Project and AECL had
evolved into a new industry with high aspirations and a new type of technical
labour.78
V. Disciplinary Identity
The preceding sections have discussed the administrative, political, and engi-
neering contexts in which nuclear engineering expertise developed in Canada
during and after the Second World War. To establish this new field, however, a
supporting occupation and discipline were also required. In effect, the conven-
tional apparatus of intellectual foundations, professional roles, and occupational
niches had to be added. These crucial elements slowly emerged during the secu-
rity-conscious postwar decade, and became hesitantly established in Canada only
twenty years after the war’s end.
Shielded by the context of isolated research and development, a coherent
identity and training for nuclear workers appeared relatively tardily. For instance,
in 1948, David Keys, as the chief scientific advisor for the Atomic Energy
Project, was asked by the Canadian Navy to suggest appropriate college engi-
neering courses for cadets “interested in the development of atomic power and
research in the atomic bomb,” and what mixture of “Engineering Physics,
Electrical Engineering, Chemical Engineering, pure Physics or Chemistry”
would be most appropriate. Keys’ answer reflected his own background:
Mathematics Honours, Mathematics and Physics, Honours
Chemistry, or Engineering Physics, in that order. They then
should proceed to graduate work in either Physics or
Chemistry. Actually a man going into this field should have a
good solid foundation in Science and although we have
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Mechanical, Electrical and Chemical Engineers, the research
end is performed more by physicists and chemists than by
engineers.79
Some colleagues were more effusive about new professional territory. B. W.
Sargent at Chalk River fielded enquiries in 1953 from would-be engineering stu-
dents, counselling one that “a graduate nuclear engineer can today practice his
profession in Canada” at AECL and the C.D. Howe company (then responsible
for building NRU, the latest Chalk River reactor). He envisaged two classes of
employment: nuclear power plant operators working for power utilities, and
designers and constructors of power plants.80
But such certified graduates did not exist and could not be produced. Formal
nuclear training in Canada, like its nuclear power-generating program, trailed
behind British and American counterparts — neither of which had open academ-
ic programs at the time. During the early postwar years David Keys noted a
chronic “scarcity of available scientists and engineers in every field”; the avail-
ability of craft workers improved, but not for the scientific and engineering pro-
fessionals.81 Security concerns, the site’s physical remoteness, and limited
employment prospects further aggravated the shortage.
Faced with a shortage of skilled nuclear workers, Chalk River, by 1951
established night school classes to teach courses ranging from first-year univer-
sity classes to the more advanced subjects of calculus, pile theory, and nuclear
physics. This was not open training for new careers, however: it was aimed at
upgrading existing technician and engineering staff, and was restricted to Chalk
River workers who had passed the usual security procedures. Following
Harwell’s earlier example in England, AECL at Chalk River also employed sum-
mer students — some of whom eventually became permanent employees — and
began regular training courses for its various professional and craft workers in
1958.82 A year later AECL began to recruit publicly. Aimed at graduates of
chemistry, physics, mathematics, biology, and chemical, mechanical, and electri-
cal engineering — established disciplines, in other words — these efforts high-
lighted the opportunities in novel areas that still lacked occupational terms such
as “operation of nuclear reactors,” “biochemistry of nucleic compounds,” “tech-
nology of reactor operations,” “disposal of radioactive wastes,” and “statistical
studies on mutation rates.” In particular, the brochures noted that “reactor
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research and development presents problems for people with post-graduate train-
ing in engineering and nuclear physics and in mechanical engineering.”83 In
short, the Chalk River site focused on three distinct tactics to obtain its needed
nuclear specialists: upskilling of technical staff, indoctrination of undergraduate
science and engineering students, and conversion of university engineering grad-
uates.
Significantly, “nuclear engineers” went unmentioned, because there was
nowhere in Canada to obtain suitable university training; technical college cours-
es appear to have been equally absent. In 1953 McGill University had briefly
offered an introductory extension course, but only five years later — after the
seminal Atoms for Peace conference — Queen’s University in Kingston, Ontario
(some 375 km from Chalk River and 175 km from Ottawa, the two principal
AECL sites), offered a one-year course in nuclear engineering launched by B.W.
Sargent. Leading to a Diploma in Engineering (Nuclear), the course centred on
“Nuclear Power Reactors, Nuclear Physics, Heat Transfer, Fluid Mechanics,
Stress Analysis, Controls, Safety, Metallurgy, and Corrosion.”84 Students could
select five courses from five domains: physics, chemistry, metallurgical engi-
neering, electrical engineering, and mechanical engineering. On even stronger
lines, McMaster University sought to become the major Canadian university for
nuclear research and nuclear engineering training, building the first university
reactor in the British Commonwealth in 1959. Significantly, both programs were
fostered by men who had been active at Chalk River.85
Gaining direct support from Atomic Energy of Canada Ltd was nevertheless
difficult. Following visits to AECL President W.B. Bennett and C.J. Mackenzie,
one of Queen’s organizers admitted “feeling rather depressed”:
I gathered that he had forgotten that he had been openly enthu-
siastic about our proposal a year or more ago. He now feels
that good Nuclear Engineers are produced by experience in the
field rather than by any formal training. Dr Mackenzie felt…
that it would be much easier to obtain support for a program
already under way than to launch a new one.86
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84 B.W. Sargent, “file 4.1 Nuclear engineering,” QU B.W. Sargent fonds, Series III Box 4.
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Atoms for Peace conference.
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Canada.
86 H.G. Conn to P. Mackintosh, letter, 2 January 1958, QU Sargent fonds Series III Box 4.
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Not all of these difficulties were attributable specifically to nuclear engineering
as a subject; academic ambitions were restrained. Good students had traditional-
ly pursued advanced degrees in other countries. Postwar Canada had twenty-
eight universities but, while a number of them offered master’s level degrees,
only two (University of Toronto and McGill University) had active research pro-
grams supporting doctoral degrees. As the pre-war president of the University of
Saskatchewan had judged, “the University has no intention of preparing candi-
dates for the Doctor’s degree... It would be folly...to add another feeble graduate
school to those that encumber the land.”87 By the late 1950s, swollen by war vet-
erans and government funding, university undergraduate enrolment and pro-
grams had trebled, but graduate studies still lagged behind. Nevertheless, as
nuclear engineering was being mooted as a new subject area in which Canadian
inroads were well established, the idea of educating home-grown specialists
seemed more plausible.
Not until 1961 did the new Canadian Nuclear Association (an industry-
focused organization rather than a professional body) address technical educa-
tion and training. It noted that a handful of universities now offered relevant
courses, but that most were too narrow to accommodate the most suitable candi-
dates — graduates of engineering physics — forcing them to enrol in either
physics or engineering departments. But the fledgling nuclear engineering cours-
es at Queen’s and the University of Ottawa had already been suspended owing to
lack of demand; indeed, the proponents at Queen’s had been forced to vacate the
building that housed their small “low energy pile” because no students at all had
registered for the nuclear power engineering course. 
There were fewer jobs in the industry than graduates. Both McMaster
University and the University of Toronto highlighted the potential of the new
field by appointing professors of nuclear engineering but compromised by build-
ing course choices around the small number of individual students to make up
for their particular educational lacunae.88 By 1966 an AECL report noted that
“because there are so few university graduate students with the appropriate kind
of academic training and orientation, the need for staff for the design and opera-
tion of nuclear reactors is being met at present by the hiring of graduates from
foreign countries.”89
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Unlike their British counterparts, then, Canadian educators defined new spe-
cialist programs as “nuclear engineering.” But they struggled to define the con-
tent of their curricula and faced perennial questions of viability. At best, educa-
tion and training programs surfaced intermittently to satisfy the unpredictable
demand for nuclear workers in Ontario and Quebec.
VI. Occupational Identity
Despite marginal academic success in training nuclear specialists by means of
special courses and new university programs, another route was effective in gen-
erating a self-aware first generation of nuclear specialists. On-the-job training via
AECL and industrial collaborations yielded a peculiarly adept breed of nuclear
specialist. With the tardy and irregular availability of university programs, how-
ever, the status and uniqueness of engineers and other technical workers was
blurred. This mixing of disciplines can be traced to the pre-war NRC heritage,
which had encouraged a culture of coexistence between scientists, engineers, and
technicians, but was considerably extended by AECL-funded development proj-
ects.
During the late 1950s, the planning of nuclear power stations brought AECL
workers into contact with traditional engineers in the power industry. The devel-
opment of power-generating nuclear reactors required expertise that had not
developed in the wartime Montreal Lab and postwar Chalk River research cul-
tures. To make the transition to more pragmatic industrial collaboration,
Canadian General Electric (CGE) — chosen to embark on the preliminary design
of the NPD reactor in 1954 — was staffed with a handful of key AECL engineers
to provide key nuclear experience. In a reciprocal fashion, the Ontario Hydro-
Electric Power Commission (“Ontario Hydro”), also collaborating with AECL
on the NPD demonstration reactor, seconded several of its engineers to CGE.
With shared experience gained in design offices, in suppliers’ factories, and with
reactor prototypes, these conventionally-trained engineers acquired practical
expertise to train subsequent industrial workers. Thus electrical, mechanical and
civil engineers were reshaped into the first Canadian nuclear engineers. 
This specialist experience was also disseminated by fostering new skills and
knowledge at the level of companies’ competences. By promoting a policy of
ensuring at least two suppliers for every nuclear-related component, AECL and
Ontario Hydro administrators encouraged technology transfer through develop-
ment and supply contracts. The addition of these new design, fabrication, and
occupational skills was accommodated in new “boundary environments” that
brought together traditional technical workers with the AECL-trained counter-
parts.
Besides this particular context of expanding working cultures and mixed
technical environments, Canada differed further from both the USA and Britain
in the way it categorized its nuclear workers. American nuclear engineers and
scientists had congregated in policy/lobby organizations after the war and a pro-
fessional society during the early 1950s. British workers, on the other hand, were
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classed according to wartime Civil Service norms defining technical categories;
for them, the “nuclear engineer” did not exist in any formal sense. In neither
country was the formation of new trade unions or labour categories officially
promoted.90
In Canada, by contrast, the National Research Council’s Chalk River site
encouraged its workforce to unionize; by 1947 many of the rate workers (that is,
non-professional tradesmen paid by weekly wage) joined union locals affiliated
with the American Federation of Labor (AFL). Following chronic complaints
about inadequate wages there was a more concerted effort after the creation of
AECL in 1952, and the new organization accommodated most of its workers in
existing unions of the Canadian Labour Congress.
Unlike in the UK, though, the Canadian Atomic Energy Project was not
averse to distinguishing its employees with fresh identities. Thus the Atomic
Research Workers’ Union (1952), Association of Atomic Energy Technicians and
Draftsmen (1953), Atomic Energy Workers’ Union (1957), and Chalk River
Nuclear Process Operators’ Union were founded to represent AECL employees.
They were marked out principally by their circumscribed working locales (ini-
tially at Chalk River only, and later with AECL sites at Ottawa and Pinawa,
Manitoba) but much less by novel job functions. Where British nuclear craft-
workers were accommodated as “general workers,” their Canadian counterparts
fell into novel, and, one might presume, status-bearing categories. The unique
activities and specialists associated with AECL were not in doubt: the Canada
Labour Relations Board listed the “nature of the employers’ business” as “cre-
ation of atomic energy.”91
Remarkably, however, these seemingly exclusive bodies represented widely
disparate skills that were not explicitly tied to the peculiar context of nuclear
radiation. Thus the Atomic Research Workers’ Union accepted AECL employees
classified as “bricklayer, painter, stores counterman, labourer, seamstress, laun-
dry operator, process operator and process trainee, maid and animal attendant,
excluding foremen, employees of higher rank, salaried personnel, office staff,
scientist staff, guards, fire-fighters and hospital nurses.”92 The Ottawa Atomic
Energy Workers — associated with the AECL Commercial Products Division,
which focused on radioisotopes — included “carpenter, painter, tool and die
maker, electronics technician, lead burner, machinist, trades helper, welder, shop
boy, labourer, stores counterman, inspector, sheet metal worker, truck driver” —
indeed, all those employees who were not numerous enough to be fitted readily
into an existing union. AECL, in conjunction with union representatives, was
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careful not to usurp the territory of existing craft unions. In short, the Canadian
labour groupings that were most clearly tied to nuclear craft-work had the weak-
est occupational identity and yet probably the highest prestige to outside eyes.
Such labelling was slower to develop for specialist salaried technical work-
ers at AECL. The Association of Atomic Energy Technicians and Draftsmen split
in the mid-1950s to form a separate craft union for draftsmen. The technicians,
dissatisfied with their representation by the American Federation of Technical
Engineers and impelled by “a feeling of national pride in the atomic Energy
Project and a resultant preference for a Canadian union,” petitioned in 1956 to
form a Canadian Association of Nuclear Energy Technicians and Technologists.
Their occupational uniqueness was not in doubt: they were “all employed at
Chalk River in the following fields of nuclear energy: (1) Biology and Health
Physics; (2) Chemistry and Metallurgy; (3) Physics Research; (4) Reactor
Research and Development; (5) Operations Division (Reactors NRX and NRU);
and, (6) Engineering.”93 Through these respective roads to union representation,
then, Canada highlighted but did not always clearly characterize its nuclear
workers, while Britain, on the whole, hid them. 
If government-mediated identities of nuclear specialists were distinct and
nuanced, public understandings were more easily directed to monochrome
views. While the hype of atomic energy was evanescent and ultimately uncon-
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Figure 1: Guilt by perceived association for atomic workers [L. Norris, Vancouver Sun, 10
November 1954.] Credit: Library and Archives Canada, Acc. No. 1988-243-30. Copyright:
Estate of Leonard Norris. Published by permission.
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vincing, the demonstrated dangers of atomic weapons provided a readily
absorbed identity. While the American and British governments acknowledged
their programs of nuclear weapon development, they and Canada were decided-
ly less forthcoming about the purpose of their research and development facili-
ties at Argonne, Oak Ridge, Harwell, and Chalk River. Bomb-making or not,
public understanding of the Canadian nuclear project was that its secretive nature
allied it to military interests and activities (Figures 1 and 2). 
VII. Conclusion: Canadian Engineers for the Canadian Context
I have argued that the early environments of nuclear development shaped a dis-
tinct national trajectory of design and professional identity in Canada. Thus key
researchers, moving from France to Britain and thence to Canada, brought with
them a preoccupation with one reactor concept: the heavy-water reactor. The
Montreal Lab was founded on the heavy-water brought from France via Norway;
its proximity shaped the group’s goals. But Anglo-Canadian efforts at the
wartime Montreal Laboratory and Chalk River were also shaped by lack of
resources, notably of graphite and enriched uranium, owing to American securi-
ty concerns within the Manhattan Project. Both during and after the war, then,
the growing body of knowledge and particular technical expertise shaped and
narrowed options for further research, making heavy-water and “neutron econo-
my” the enduring central threads of the Canadian nuclear experience. 
Engineering designs were also influenced critically by economics, which
was specific to national contexts. British reactor feasibility was determined, for
example, by its cost relative to coal-generated electricity. If nuclear power could
be forecast as being marginally cheaper or available for longer than coal, then
power plant design, construction, operation, and maintenance were judged
worthwhile. The relative cost included considerable uncertainty: materials in
nuclear reactors were being operated in novel conditions of temperature and irra-
diation. Unfamiliar dangers, such as degradation of materials or accidents of
radiation release, were acknowledged but as yet largely unpredictable. And the
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Figure 2: Atomic espionage for
popular consumption [Joe
Haliday, Dale of the Mounted:
Atomic Plot. Toronto, Thomas
Allen Ltd. (1959)]. Reprinted by
permission of the publisher,
Thomas Allen, Limited.
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adjustable parameter in that economic equation was the sales cost of the plutoni-
um produced by the reactor, dubbed the “plutonium credit” in Britain. In Canada,
such economic concerns included additional energy options, and the plutonium
credit was a significant hidden variable in determining the design options pur-
sued.
Just as Canadian reactor designs were a defining national feature, so too
were the characteristics of the nuclear workforce. Nuclear workers were isolated
by international secrecy in atomic energy and shaped by particular national
forces. The institutional cultures of the National Research Council and Imperial
Chemical Industries both strongly flavoured wartime Canadian nuclear engineer-
ing. As an NRC project and then a spun-off Crown Corporation under the unusu-
ally single-minded direction of C.J. Mackenzie, and then W.B. Lewis and David
Keys, the atomic energy project fostered a relatively comfortable collaboration
between engineers and scientists to meet changing national goals. Chalk River,
as the isolated nucleus of the discipline and occupation in Canada, also promot-
ed goals distinctly different from, and more coherent than, its wartime allies.
Government policy decreed that Canadian nuclear workers in the postwar years
could concentrate on scientific and engineering research founded on reactor
development, neutron properties, and radioisotopes instead of bomb fabrication
and development. Canadian university engineering departments sought to
expand into academic territory guaranteed by a new national industry. In close
association with Chalk River personnel, they launched degree-granting programs
during the late 1950s and early 1960s to define new academic terrain. Canadian
labour laws, interpreted in an environment in which atomic energy represented
expertise that boosted national status, permitted the self-definition of these new
technical specialists.  The result of these disparate factors — uniting limited
resources, isolated knowledge, and an active but atypical pool of technical work-
ers in a unique working context — was a distinct national field.
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